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Abstract
This paper examines the behavior of a monopolist in a framework where consumer
preferences display habit persistence. We show that, in the absence of precommit-
ment, output and price setting policies yield di®erent outcomes in terms of equilibrium
prices and allocations. Instrument selection determines the strategic properties of the
intra-personal game: from the viewpoint of the ¯rm, current and future quantities are
strategic complements, while current and future prices are strategic substitutes. We
analyze a simple two-period model and an in¯nite horizon model. In both cases, we
¯nd that price targeting allows the monopolist to attain higher equilibrium pro¯ts.
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11 Introduction
In their pioneering work, Becker and Murphy (1988) study addictive behavior by intro-
ducing habits in a rational choice framework. Since then, there has been a surge in litera-
ture employing non-separable preferences1. Habit formation implies a link between current
marginal utility and past consumption, which can explain several important economic phe-
nomena both at the micro and macro levels. Examples of the former are binging behavior
and the demand for alcohol or cigarettes (Chalopupka (1991), Becker, Grossman, and Mur-
phy (1994)). The latter include the equity premium puzzle and the responses of consumer
spending and in°ation to monetary-policy actions (Constantinides (1990) and Fuhrer (2000),
respectively).
As ¯rst noted by Pollak (1970), habit-based preferences give rise to inherently dynamic
demand functions: present consumption levels depend on past and current prices, as well as
on expectations regarding future market policies. Thus, producers of addictive goods face an
intertemporal trade-o®. By boosting current sales, they can speed up habit formation, which
in turn will generate higher sales tomorrow. Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) note
that addictive consumption has interesting implications for the behavior of non-competitive
¯rms. Expectations of future market conduct give rise to dynamic inconsistency issues:
¯rms' inability to pre-commit creates a strategic con°ict between the current decision maker
and her future selves. Time-consistent market policies must account for this internal con°ict,
which constrains ¯rms' choices and adversely a®ects pro¯ts.
This paper studies the implications of habit formation for the market power of monopo-
listic ¯rms. In particular, we explore the e®ect of instrument selection on ¯rm conduct and
pro¯tability. We challenge the standard hypothesis that producers follow output strategies.
In the absence of precommitment, this assumption is rather ad-hoc: our analysis shows that
it is not as innocuous as it seems. Therefore, the modeler's choice of the ¯rms' decision
variables should be contingent on the nature of the habit-forming good.
It should be noted that, under full precommitment, the issue of instrument selection is
irrelevant. With binding contracts, price postings, or strong reputational mechanisms in
place, output policies are equivalent to pricing policies. However, when up-front precommit-
ment is not feasible, these decision variables generate di®erent market outcomes in terms
of equilibrium prices, quantities and pro¯ts. The intuition is that if consumer preferences
exhibit distant complementarities, current marginal pro¯t will be increasing in expected
future output. Thus, a monopolist will perceive current and future production levels as
intertemporal strategic complements. On the other hand, price targeting implies that the
1For a detailed survey of literature on habit persistence, see Messinis (1999).
2current monopolist will compete with her future selves in terms of strategic substitutes. In
intra-personal games, where all players are agents of a single decision maker, it is plausible
that some degree of cooperation will emerge in equilibrium. Since competition in strategic
substitutes is usually more benign and translates into higher equilibrium pro¯ts, the ¯rm is
likely to adopt price targeting.
With long planning horizons (both ¯nite and in¯nite), time-consistent policies are often
derived using a recursive formulation of the decision problem, in which history is summarized
by state variables. Applying dynamic programming techniques to the monopolist's pricing
problem can be di±cult, as the current demand for a habit forming good may depend
on the sequence of all past and future prices. While output targeting may be easier to
formulate recursively, the derived equilibria will be implausible if a simple change in the
decision variable enables ¯rms to attain higher payo®s in each period. Moreover, this paper
provides an example where both output and price setting can be de¯ned recursively. When
such transformations of the state and policy spaces are possible, modeling decisions need
to carefully account for the strategic properties of policy instruments, as these can have
important repercussions for market conduct and performance.
The few papers that study monopolistic production of habit-forming goods typically as-
sume that ¯rms implement output policies. Driskill and McCa®erty (2001) use a continuous
time setting to explore the e®ect of habit persistence in monopolistic and oligopolistic indus-
tries. They ¯nd that, in the absence of precommitment, industry pro¯ts may be higher under
less concentrated market structures. Fethke and Jagannathan (1996) develop a model with
consumers of two types: those with habits and those without. They show that when ¯rms
choose output levels, steady state consumption is lower under a time-consistent monopoly
than under perfect competition or monopoly commitment. The strength of habits and the
fraction of habitual consumers does not a®ect the outcomes under competition and monopoly
commitment.
More generally, our results are related the literature on disadvantageous market power.
Karp (1996) and other authors have shown in various settings that the inability to precommit
will limit the decision-maker's discretion. The issue of time-consistent market policies has
also gained signi¯cant prominence in the context of durable goods monopolies. In these
models, a purchasing decision provides consumers with a stream of bene¯ts over time. It has
long been recognized that durability creates expectations of future policies that adversely
a®ect market power (Coase (1972)). However, under the standard assumptions, producers
of durable goods will view output levels as strategic substitutes (instead of complements).
The majority of papers in this ¯eld (e.g. Bulow (1982), Stokey (1981)) correctly focus on
output policies, which yield higher equilibrium pro¯ts relative to price targeting.
3The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a simple two-period
model of a monopolist who produces an addictive good. Consumers' preferences are assumed
to exhibit distant complementarities. This setting enables us to illustrate the intuition
underlying our results: we show that, in the absence of precommitment, the implementation
of pricing policies will amount to an intra-personal game in strategic substitutes, while output
policies imply competition in strategic complements. Thus, a time-consistent monopolist can
attain higher pro¯ts if she maximizes her pro¯ts with respect to prices instead of quantities.
Section 3 analyzes an in¯nite horizon model, suitably modi¯ed to allow for a recursive
representation of both the price and the output setting problems. The results obtained in
the two-period setting also hold in the in¯nite horizon case. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 The two-period model
In this section, we use a simple two-period setting to compare the implications of instru-
ment selection in an environment of habit persistence. We introduce addiction in the model
by adopting a preference structure similar to Becker and Murphy (1988). The monopolist's




Consider an industry where a representative consumer derives utility from two goods:
a numeraire good m, and a habit forming good, x. We assume quasi-linear utility, which
allows us to disregard income e®ects: the demand for x will depend only on relative prices.
Without loss of generality, suppose that consumption of the numeraire takes place only in
period 1. The addictive good is consumed in both periods.
Due to habit formation, the marginal utility derived from x in the second period depends
on the amount consumed in period 1. Following Carroll (2000), we adopt a \subtractive
habit speci¯cation"2:
U(m;x1;x2;Ã) = m + v(x1) + ±u(x2 ¡ Ãx1), (1)
where v(¢);u(¢) are twice di®erentiable and concave felicity functions, ± is the discount factor
and subscripts t = 1;2 refer to time. The parameter Ã re°ects the strength of habit persis-
2See Bossi and Gomis-Porqueras (2006) for a study on the di®erences between alternative formulations
of habit persistence in the literature.
4tence. We consider values of Ã 2 [0;1], so that current marginal utility is increasing in past
consumption. We also impose the condition that Ã <
x2
x1 so that the e®ective consumption




00 (x1 ¡ Ãx2).
Thus, using the terminology of Becker and Murphy (1988), x1 and x2 exhibit distant com-
plementarities. This preference speci¯cation is often used to capture addiction: the higher
the period-1 consumption level, the more consumption is required in the following period to
derive a given level of utility.
The consumer faces the budget constraint m + p1x1 + p2x2 = w, where pt denotes the
price of good x in period t and w is lifetime wealth. The price of m is normalized to 1.
Standard utility maximization yields the following inverse demands:
p1(x1;x2) = v
0(x1) ¡ Ã±u
0 (x2 ¡ Ãx1), p2(x1;x2) = ±u
0 (x2 ¡ Ãx1). (2)
From (2) we obtain the dynamic demand system:
x1(p1;p2) = v
0¡1




(p1 + Ãp2). (3)
In accordance with Becker and Murphy (1988) and Singh and Vives (1984), we assume
linear-quadratic felicity functions. The linearity of the implied demand schedules substan-
tially simpli¯es computations. In particular, we assume that:














where ® > 0 is a taste parameter. This functional form yields inverse demands
p1(x1;x2) = ® ¡ ±®Ã ¡ (1 + ±Ã
2)x1 + ±Ãx2; p2(x1;x2) = ±® + ±Ãx1 ¡ ±x2, (5)
which correspond to the following demand system:





The habit forming good is manufactured by a single ¯rm. In the beginning of each period,
the ¯rm announces the current value of its policy instrument (prices or output levels) and
5then buyers make their consumption decisions. Let fztg be the policy instrument adopted




t=1. We will use ¼t 2 fb ¼t;e ¼tg to denote the
corresponding instantaneous payo® function and ¦ 2 fe ¦; b ¦g to denote the lifetime pro¯ts
at period 1.
For simplicity, assume that the monopolist does not incur production costs.3 Using (5)
and (6), we can write instantaneous pro¯ts as functions of either output levels or prices:
b ¼1(x1;x2) = p1(x1;x2)x1, b ¼2(x1;x2) = p2(x1;x2)x2 (7)
e ¼1(p1;p2) = p1x1(p1;p2), e ¼2(p1;p2) = p2x2(p1;p2). (8)
Accordingly, the period-1 lifetime pro¯ts are given by:
b ¦(x1;x2) = b ¼1(x1;x2) + ±b ¼2(x1;x2); e ¦(p1;p2) = e ¼1(p1;p2) + ±e ¼2(p1;p2). (9)














Thus, if preferences exhibit distant complementarities (Ã > 0) and the monopolist is unable
to precommit up-front, her period-1 and period-2 selves will perceive output levels as strategic
complements and prices as strategic substitutes.
2.2 Precommitment policies
First, suppose that in period 1 the ¯rm can precommit to future policies. Under full
precommitment, the monopolist is not constrained by consumer expectations, thus her pro¯t
would exceed the payo® she can attain in any time-consistent equilibrium.
This problem is reminiscent of static price discrimination in two interlinked markets. The











®(2 ¡ ±Ã + ±2Ã)
4 + 2±Ã2 ¡ ±2Ã2 ¡ Ã2, x
PC
2 =
®(Ã ¡ ±Ã2 + ±Ã + 2± + ±2Ã2)
±(4 + 2±Ã2 ¡ ±2Ã2 ¡ Ã2)
(10)




®(2 ¡ ±Ã ¡ ±2Ã + ±Ã2 ¡ ±2Ã2)
4 + 2±Ã2 ¡ ±2Ã2 ¡ Ã2 , p
PC
2 =
®(2± ¡ Ã + ±Ã)
4 + 2±Ã2 ¡ ±2Ã2 ¡ Ã2. (11)


























Thus, under precommitment the equilibrium outcomes are equivalent, regardless of the ¯rm's
choice variable.
2.3 Time-consistent policies
Next, we assume away precommitment and focus on the time-consistent output and
pricing strategies. Consumers' expectations of future market policies impose a constraint on
the current decision maker, which prevents her from attaining the precommitment optimum.
The policy prescribed by her precommitment plan will create an incentive for the monopolist
to revise her choice in the subsequent period. She correctly anticipates future temptations
to deviate and responds strategically. Thus, a time-consistent decision-maker is essentially
playing a Stackelberg game against her future self.
To determine the equilibrium of this intra-personal game, we use backward induction.
Once period 2 is reached, past events will be considered irrelevant. At this point, the
monopolist disregards the e®ect of her decisions on the period-1 pro¯ts: she would choose z2






® + ®Ã ¡ 'p1
2±Ã2 + 2
.
In period 1, the decision maker anticipates the behavior of her future self and chooses z1





®(2 ¡ ±Ã + ±2Ã)
4 + 2±Ã2 + ±2Ã2 , x
TC
2 =
®(4 + ±Ã2 + 2Ã)
2(4 + 2±Ã2 + ±2Ã2)
, (12)




®(2 ¡ ±Ã + ±Ã2 ¡ ±2Ã ¡ ±2Ã2)
4 + 2±Ã2 ¡ ±2Ã2 , p
TC
2 =
®±(4 + 3±Ã2 + 2Ã + ±Ã3)
2(4 + 2±Ã2 + ±2Ã2)(1 + ±Ã2)
. (13)
To demonstrate the di®erences across policy instruments, we compare the e®ects of
price and output targeting on market outcomes. Table 1 provides information regarding
the equilibrium prices and quantities, as well as the corresponding lifetime pro¯ts. The
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Table 1: Equilibrium outcomes under time-consistent price setting vs. output setting.
comparison shows that the equivalence of policy instruments unravels if ¯rms are unable to
precommit. Moreover, when ® > 0;Ã 2 (0;1], and ± 2 (0;1], price targeting always yields a
higher lifetime pro¯t.
We gain further insight if we compare the time-consistent equilibria to the precommit-
ment plan derived in the previous subsection. Table 2 shows that, regardless of the policy
instrument, consumer expectations will force a time-consistent decision maker to set a period-
1 price below her precommitment optimum pPC
1 , while the period-2 price will be above the
precommitment optimum pPC
2 . However, under price targeting, the monopolist's intertem-
poral selves compete in terms of strategic substitutes. This allows the ¯rm to maintain
equilibrium policy levels closer to their precommitment values, resulting in higher pro¯ts.















®Ã (¡8+4± Ã¡4±2 Ã¡2± Ã2+2±2 Ã2+±2 Ã3¡2±3 Ã3+±4 Ã3)





¡®Ã2 (¡4+2± Ã¡2±2 Ã+2±2 Ã2+±2 Ã3¡2±3 Ã3¡2± Ã2+±4 Ã3)
2(¡4¡2± Ã2+Ã2+±2 Ã2)(¡4¡2± Ã2+±2 Ã2) > 0
Table 2: Equilibrium outcomes under precommitment vs. time-consistent price setting.
Figure 1 illustrates that the advantages of price targeting increase when Ã;± are high. If
the good is more addictive and agents are patient, the monopolist's time consistency problem
worsens. This widens the discrepancy between price and output targeting.
Figure 1 here
To summarize, we ¯nd that in the case of precommitment, the monopolist's problem is
identical to that of static price discrimination in interlinked markets. This, in turn, implies
the equivalence of policy instruments. However, when the ¯rm is unable to precommit, this
equivalence no longer holds. In the next section, we show that this result holds also in an
in¯nite-horizon framework.
83 The in¯nite-horizon model
In this section, we analyze pro¯t maximization when the planning horizon is in¯nite. We
devise a model which is amenable to changes in the state and choice variables: it can be
formulated recursively under both output and price targeting. This setup di®ers from the
two-period model in two aspects. On the demand side, we introduce overlapping generations
of consumers. We assume that the monopolist can price discriminate between the young and
old buyers. This hypothesis ¯ts with recent empirical evidence on cigarette consumption4.
The implied demand system enables us to study price and quantity regimes via a simple
transformation of the state space. On the supply side, we assume that the monopolist incurs
convex production costs. Thus, the marginal cost of serving the current young will depend
on the output sold to the current old. These cost complementarities create a link between
the contemporaneous markets.
We demonstrate that, under full precommitment, instrument selection is irrelevant. The
analysis of time-consistent policies focuses on the Markov-perfect equilibrium (MPE) in
di®erentiable strategies of the intra-personal game. As Driskill and McCa®erty (2001) point
out, this solution concept is particularly appealing since it is the limit of the ¯nite game
as the planning horizon expands to in¯nity. We compute the MPE pricing and output
strategies and show that they imply di®erences in market conduct. This ¯nding reinforces
the non-equivalence result obtained in Section 2.
3.1 Setup
Consider two-period lived overlapping generations of consumers. As in Section 2, indi-
viduals derive utility from a numeraire good, m (when young), and a habit-forming good,
x. Let x
y
t denote the addictive consumption of a person who is young in period t and xo
t+1
be the addictive consumption of that person when old in period t + 1. The lifetime utility





































4Weinberg (2005) matches data on brand level advertising with consumer level brand choice data and
shows that young teenagers and adult smokers exhibit di®erent degrees of sensitivity to prices. This implies
that producers of habit-forming goods will bene¯t from price discrimination. Chaloupka and Pacula (2001)
also suggest that teenagers respond di®erently than adults to cigarette prices for several reasons: young
smokers 1) are likely to spend a greater share of their income on cigarettes; 2) are strongly a®ected by peer
pressure; 3) will be less addicted than adults; and 4) are presumably more myopic.
9Assume that the monopolist can price discriminate between the young and the old.






t+1 = w, where p
y
t denotes
the period¡t price the young generation faces and po
t+1 is the period¡t + 1 price the old






















































On the production side, suppose that the monopolist has a convex cost function. Follow-












where c > 0 is a constant. From the ¯rm's perspective, this cost structure generates a payo®






















t=1. Let ¼ 2 fb ¼;e ¼g be the
corresponding instantaneous payo® function. The above assumptions imply that, contingent































































First, suppose that in period 1 the monopolist can precommit to the entire lifetime
sequence fzy;zog1
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®(±Ãc + 2±Ã + 2± + ±c ¡ c)
2(2± + ±c + c + c±Ã2 + ±Ãc)
.




®(c±Ã(Ã + 2 ¡ ±(1 ¡ Ã2 ¡ 2Ã)) + ±(3c + 2 ¡ 2±Ã) + c)




±®(2± + ±Ãc(2 + Ã) + c(± + 3 + Ã))
2(2± + ±c + c + c±Ã2 + ±Ãc)
.

































Next, we analyze time-consistent decision making in the absence of precommitment. We
focus the analysis on Markovian strategies: the policies are restricted to be di®erentiable













and perfect foresight imply that the equilibrium policies solve the following Bellman equation:
V (z
t¡1













t )) + ±V (z
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t )g. (19)







































t )) + ±V (z
y
t )g. (21)
De¯nition 1 The Markov-perfect equilibrium of the intra-personal game is characterized
by a value function V : R+ ! R which solves (19) and a pair of strategy functions f;g :
R+ ! R+ which is a ¯xed point of the mapping de¯ned by (20) and (21).













































t ) = 0. (23)
































































represents the \internal strategic e®ect". It accounts for the attempt
of the current monopolist to strategically in°uence the behavior of her future self. This term
disappears if the time-consistency problem is resolved.


























We substitute these conjectures in (22) through (25) and use the method of undetermined
coe±cients to compute the equilibrium strategy parameters ay;ao;by;bo;dy;do;ey;eo.
123.3.2 Price targeting vs. Output targeting
The closed-form solution of the problem is rather intractable, so we illustrate our results
using numerical examples.
Figure 2 to 6 here
Figures 2 through 6 show the di®erences between the two instruments in terms of pro¯ts,
prices, and quantities as we vary the strength of habits and the discount factor. By comparing
the Markov-perfect equilibria of the intra-personal quantity and pricing games, we ¯nd that
the monopolist can attain higher steady-state pro¯ts by following a price strategy (see Figure
2).
Our numerical simulations con¯rm the results obtained in the two-period model. Under
both output and price targeting, the MPE is characterized by prices that are below the pre-
commitment optimum in the young buyers' market, but above the precommitment optimum
in the old buyers' market. However, when the monopolist implements price targeting, she
can sustain policies which are closer to the precommitment plan. The di®erences between
price and output targeting are further compounded in the market comprised of old buyers.
Also, note that when the discount factor and the degree of habit persistence are high, the
monopolist's time consistency problem will worsen. This translates into larger discrepancies
between the two regimes.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies the market conduct of a monopolist in a framework where consumer
preferences display habit persistence. We use two simple models to demonstrate that time-
consistent output and pricing strategies yield di®erent equilibrium prices and allocations.
To the best of our knowledge, this observation has gone formally untreated and empirically
untested in models dealing with market power and habit persistence. Thus, our main con-
tribution is to show that, in the absence of precommitment, the choice of strategies plays an
important role in determining market outcomes.
The intuition behind our results is based on the di®erent strategic properties of prices
and quantities in the intra-personal game which determines the time-consistent equilibrium.
If the policy variable is output, current and future quantities become strategic complements.
In contrast, when the monopolist implements pricing policies, current and future prices are
strategic substitutes. Consequently, price targeting mitigates intra-personal competition
and allows the ¯rm to attain higher pro¯ts. Since the intra-personal game is played by
intertemporal agents of the same decision maker, they are likely to coordinate to the superior
13equilibrium. Thus, our result has important methodological implications: when studying
monopolistic conduct in models with habit persistence, one should account for the strategic
properties of market policies.
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Figure 6: Case (a). Plot of xo(py
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s:s: for ± = 0:8 as one varies Ã 2 [0;1]. In both cases c = 0:5, ® = 2.
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